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Real-Time Response Review – DEC programme for Cyclone Idai

Synthesis report – Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe

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Contribution

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Collaboration

The DEC and the Humanitarian Coalition (HC) in Canada have made an ongoing commitment to collaborate, where appropriate, when undertaking such reviews due to a significant overlap in membership ([see Annex XI.1](#)).¹ In this instance, Care, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Oxfam, Plan International and Save the Children are shared DEC/HC responders, along with a number of local/ national partners. Whilst it was not considered necessary for the Humanitarian Coalition programmes to be assessed separately, the head office in Canada actively contributed at inception phase, sent a senior representative to accompany field work in Zimbabwe, and participated in the learning workshops in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The Humanitarian Coalition has also committed to translate the report into French language and proactively support with dissemination.

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¹ <https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca>

Executive summary

In March 2019, Tropical Cyclone Idai swept through three Southern African countries (Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi), killing at least 900 people and leaving around three million in need of assistance after causing catastrophic flooding and wind damage.² Over the past decade, a mix of extreme weather conditions (including flooding and droughts), economic shocks, and political crises hit Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi, eroding households' resilience to new shocks and ability to cope with financial hardship and food insecurity. Additionally, prior to Cyclone Idai, fall armyworm has damaged food and other crop production, and remains today a significant threat to food security and livelihoods.

Cyclone Idai damaged and destroyed homes, hospitals, roads, schools, and farms. The storm compromised safe water and sanitation and led to a cholera outbreak in Mozambique; reduced access to basic health services; and swept away or damaged food, documents, and other household assets. It created or exacerbated protection risks, particularly for vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities (PWD), older persons (OP) and children.³⁴ In Mozambique, after the closure of emergency and transit accommodation centres, 63 permanent resettlement sites have been established in which 66,118 internally displaced people now live.⁵ Many of these permanent resettlement sites lack basic services, including latrines and water provision.⁶

In the wake of Cyclone Idai's aftermath in March 2019, the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) launched an appeal to address the cyclone's impact in the three countries of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Nine DEC members are implementing the response in Malawi⁷ and in Mozambique⁸, while seven DEC members implement the response in

² UNOCHA, "Mozambique: Cyclone Idai & Floods Situation Report No. 19 (As of 29 April 2019)," Situation report, April 29, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-cyclone-idai-floods-situation-report-no-19-29-april-2019>.

³ Humanitarian Country Team and UNOCHA, "Humanitarian Response Plan (Revised Following Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, May 2019)," November 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ROSEA_20190525_MozambiqueFlashAppeal.pdf.

⁴ USAID, "SOUTHERN AFRICA - TROPICAL CYCLONE IDAI - FACT SHEET #9 FY2019," 2019, <https://www.usaid.gov/cyclone-idai/fy19/fs9>.

⁵ UNHCR, "Tropical Cyclone Idai: Mozambique Situation Report #18 Reporting Period: 1 - 14 July 2019," July 16, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70322.pdf>.

⁶ Unicef, "20190702 Resettlements WASH Mapping," n.d.

⁷ Plan International; Save the Children; Christian Aid; World Vision International; Oxfam; Tearfund; Age International; Concern Worldwide; and Islamic Relief

⁸ ActionAid, Age International, British Red Cross (BRC), Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Care International UK, Oxfam, Plan International UK, Save the Children UK and World Vision

Zimbabwe.⁹ The DEC response is currently in Phase One (March 2019 – September 2019), with Phase Two due to start in October 2019.

A real-time review (RTR) was commissioned by the DEC with the purpose of collecting reflection and learning in a participatory manner while the project is being implemented. In total, 421 individuals contributed to the review by identifying best practices, sharing lessons learned, making recommendations and giving feedback on the preliminary findings. The review will be used to make program changes in different areas of the response, during the final months of Phase One implementation as well as in the design of Phase Two activities.

This synthesis report complements the three country reports by providing overarching findings and recommendations. It can be read in conjunction with the country reports or as a standalone overview of the DEC members' response to Cyclone Idai.

Relevance and appropriateness of the response

Geographical targeting aligned with the areas hit by the cyclone. Inclusion error (areas that were not heavily affected receiving interventions) was not cited as a problem of this response. However, in Mozambique, and to a lesser extent Malawi, exclusion errors (areas which were heavily affected not receiving interventions) were flagged as a challenge for the entire cyclone response (i.e. not just DEC members), primarily due to limited accessibility.

DEC members made a deliberate effort to accurately **assess the needs** of populations affected by the disaster and used participatory needs assessments to inform the sectoral priorities. Most of the assessments shared with the review team included information on **protection issues** facing the population. Those were then used to tailor the responses to distinct needs and vulnerabilities of different groups.

The **sectors** that received the most funding were not always the same as those that had been deemed a priority by inter-agency need assessments or by focus group discussion (FGD) participants. Livelihoods was one of the most funded sectors in Mozambique and Malawi, however, the agricultural activities did not always correspond with the seasonal calendar for the locations and did not include pest control in districts that were subsequently heavily affected by fall armyworm. In Mozambique, shelter was surprisingly only the fifth most-funded sector despite being highlighted as a priority both by FGDs and assessments.

Across all countries under study, respondents and communities interviewed felt that available funding was insufficient to **cover** the variety and scope of needs. Unmet needs included shelter (particularly permanent shelter materials), clothing, and access to crucial infrastructure such as roads and bridges.

⁹ World Vision, OXFAM, Action Aid, CAFOD, Save the Children, Christian Aid and Age International

The comparison between the members' **intended outcomes and planned outputs** demonstrates a clear logical link both across sectors and between DEC members. The design of the cyclone response is consistent with the overall goal and objectives. In specific instances, however, the outputs planned appeared to be limited in meeting the intended outcomes. For instance, in Mozambique, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) outcomes were only related to water supply and had no sanitation or hygiene promotion activities.

Effectiveness in achieving intended outcomes

Interventions by the DEC member agencies were found to be fairly effective. Key informants from DEC agencies, across all three countries, were confident that the **planned outcomes** were being achieved, with the exception of some delays as well as adaptations based on changing circumstances. Procurement issues and government restrictions on cash and voucher assistance (CVA) in Mozambique increased delays in delivery of in-kind items and reduced cost-effectiveness. A sudden directive by the government of Zimbabwe to stop provision of temporary shelters forced DEC member agencies to change plans and made it difficult for the consultants to determine the effectiveness of the shelter interventions. Similarly, although they indicated avenues for improvement such as an increase in the provision of food aid, discussions with the communities gave qualitative confirmation on the satisfaction of affected communities who received assistance from DEC members.

The **timely delivery** of assistance was area-, organisation-, sector-, and modality-specific. Timely delivery was often possible in instances where agencies had enough start-up funds to initiate the response and/or had pre-existing stock. Nonetheless, across countries, key informants and communities reported some **delays** in procurement processes due to legal requirements, lack of access to certain areas of intervention (particularly in Malawi) and issues with disbursement procedures. As such, some shelter distributions in Mozambique still have not started. Such issues with procurement raised questions amongst the consultants regarding the extent to which implementing organisations had a good understanding of how local markets function. The timeliness of the response also depended on the **modality** used by the organisation. Agencies which used cash grants reported more delays than those which used in-kind. This can be the result of a lack of experience and preparedness at agency level (e.g. lack of framework agreements with Financial Service Providers).

Overall **quality and diversity** of the assistance provided was deemed good both by key informants and crisis-affected households. Nonetheless, some issues with the quality of the hybrid seeds distributed in Mozambique were reported, as was a quality gap in referrals to health services for patients with chronic illnesses, nutrition patients and, potentially, for survivors of gender-based violence (GBV).

Accountability to affected population

In line with their Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) commitments, DEC members in the three countries of intervention put in place thorough measures to ensure **community participation** across the project cycle. The views of crisis-affected households were given consideration in the assessment phase through gender-segregated needs assessments.

Across all countries, the vast majority of FGDs participants knew why they were part of the programme and understood that interventions **targeted** specific groups. Despite this, some contention existed between beneficiaries regarding the extent to which the targeting was fair (especially for food assistance in Zimbabwe).

DEC members in all three countries have endeavoured to ensure that **multiple complaint channels** were available to beneficiaries of their programmes. These mechanisms ranged from confidential to more public mechanisms, including suggestion boxes and toll-free numbers, face-to-face mechanisms such as help desks, local beneficiary committees, contact numbers for agency staff, and use of local leadership. Suggestion boxes that were very common in Malawi raise the question of access in a country with a low literacy rate. The use of a hotline in Mozambique also tended to be over relied upon, raising questions in terms of access but also in terms of data protection. Beneficiary **awareness** regarding the existence of such complaint mechanisms differed strongly depending on the location. Although only a small number of beneficiaries interviewed had used such a mechanism to submit a complaint, some of those who did reported that measures were taken by DEC members on the basis of the feedback they provided.

Sustainability and connectedness of the response

Across the three countries of intervention, Phase One was designed as an emergency response. As such, it rightly focused on the provision of assistance aiming to cover basic needs. There were no disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities in any of the countries of intervention.

The strong focus on livelihoods activities across all countries of intervention is a good indicator of DEC members' willingness to pave the way to **early recovery**. DEC members consistently across contexts included activities that aimed to prepare the country for longer-term needs and various DEC members have endeavoured to link emergency and longer-term programmes. In Malawi, many humanitarian actors, including DEC members are now considering engaging with social protection programmes.

One of the main barriers to closer links between emergency response and longer-term development efforts was the lack of involvement of development team members in the design and implementation of the Phase One of the response, with the notable exception of the COSACA consortium in Mozambique.

The **environment** is a particularly relevant cross-cutting issue when looking at cyclone responses. As for an earthquake, the destruction of infrastructure following a cyclone may increase pollution levels in the atmosphere and water.¹⁰ However, environmental considerations were not prioritised by the Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe DEC responses; most key informants did not have information on the environmental impact of the response (i.e. how their activities affect the environment). Those who did discuss the environment only mentioned that they were considering how to incorporate building back better (BBB) and DRR in their shelter and livelihoods activities, especially as the threat of future cyclones remains high for these communities. Only one DEC member, the Red Cross, is undertaking a “green review” to assess the impact of its operations on the environment and environmental considerations in its activities.

Coordination and complementarity

DEC member agencies in each country face different set of issues related to coordination. In Mozambique, many of the stakeholders (DEC member agency staff, implementing partners, and government representatives) speak either English or Portuguese but not both, meaning that many of them are blocked from participating in meetings held only in one of those languages. Second, many local organisations were or are not familiar with the cluster system and found it hard to navigate, which resulted in some partners not being very active in the coordination fora.

Informants in Zimbabwe reported a different set of issues. For them, the most important challenge was the numerous layers of coordination in place at the beginning of the response, with up to four or five coordination meetings taking place each day.

In Malawi, informants reported gaps in district level coordination as well as delays to set up the coordination of the response. For instance, cash amounts currently differ across agencies, due to delay in guidance from the Cash Working Group.

Overall, informants reported regular participation of DEC members to coordination meetings and willingness to share. There is no specific DEC-level coordination mechanism, and, rightfully, no intent to add one, so the RTR workshops were often the first occasions DEC members had to meet and discuss as DEC since the start of the response. DEC member

¹⁰ H.Juillard and J.Jourdain, 2018, Earthquake lesson paper, ALNAP

agency staff found the sharing of ideas and challenges as DEC members to be beneficial and expressed the desire to continue doing so, potentially with future learning and planning workshops.

Conclusion

Cyclone response presents unique challenges: physical access is difficult in the first few days and communication is constrained by infrastructure destruction. In spite of those challenges, DEC's response to the Cyclone Idai can be considered a success, in so far that it provided a flexible source of funds that allowed members to adapt their responses quickly to changing circumstances, addressed those needs the targeted communities' expressed as being the most relevant, and made efforts to build accountability to affected populations (AAP) into the response. DEC members' global organisational commitment towards the CHS cascaded down at country level. The intended level of participation of the communities in the response was high from the start and aligned with CHS commitments. However, it should be further increased over time and after the first few weeks of the response.

Cross-cutting issues such as gender and protection were incorporated at all stages of the response, but environmental considerations should be prioritised. There is a high likelihood that environmental disasters will hit Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe again in the coming years, whether it be a drought in a coming agriculture season or another cyclone. Preparing for possible future disasters would help strengthen the gains made in this response and potentially protect people from the worst effects of another disaster.

One of the DEC response's strengths was that the diversity of its members allowed for an array of best practices and lessons learned to be seen in this review, saving other members time and effort in identifying better ways to implement. DEC funding is the ninth largest source of funding for the appeal in Mozambique and the fifth in Zimbabwe, hence making significant contributions towards covering crisis-affected households needs.¹¹

What DEC members have done organically, especially in Malawi, to increase coherence between humanitarian and development actions, should be capitalised upon and systematised going into Phase Two.

Recommendations

1. Look out for potential issues related to land tenure and lack of identification documents.

¹¹ Source : Financial Tracking Services, UNOCHA

2. Favour the repair of existing structures and advocate with the governments to turn to resettlement only as a last resort measure.
3. Use transitional shelters with care and prioritise permanent shelter solutions.
4. Consider conditional assistance for Phase One only, to support debris-clearing efforts.
5. DEC to track CVA as a modality not as a sector and ensure consistency with cash learning partnership (CaLP) glossary.
6. Use DEC membership as an opportunity for horizontal learning, joint risk assessment and explore better programme design alignment.
7. Ensure all DEC members and partner organizations know what DEC is.
8. Ensure crisis-affected households have multiple channels to provide feedback and complaints.
9. Analyse, use and support markets including the labour market.
10. Define in a participatory manner what being resilient means.
11. Ensure joint analysis for Phase Two design.
12. Identify important environmental considerations for the response.

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List of acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Population
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
BBB	Building Back Better
BRC	British Red Cross
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CaLP	Cash and Learning Partnership
CFM	Complaints and Feedback Mechanism
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
COE	Emergency Operation Centre
CPU	Civil Protection Unit
CTGC	Technical Council for Disaster Management
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DoDMA	Department of Disaster Management Affairs
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAA	Emergency Appeals Alliance
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
INGC	National Institute for Disaster Management
ID	Identification Document
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NFI	Non-Food Item
OP	Older Persons
OPC	Office of President and Cabinet
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PS	Principal Secretary
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
RTR	Real-Time Review
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
TA	Traditional Authority
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VSL	Village Savings and Loans
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

I. Introduction

I.1. Humanitarian context

Last March, Tropical Cyclone Idai swept through three Southern African countries (Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi), killing at least 900 people and leaving around three million in need of assistance.¹² The UN estimated that Cyclone Idai was the deadliest storm system of 2019 and may be the worst disaster ever to strike the southern hemisphere.¹³

In early March 2019, prior to landfall as a cyclone, the tropical depression caused rain and flooding in Malawi and Mozambique, which displaced nearly 87,000 people in Malawi and 17,100 in Mozambique.¹⁴¹⁵ After strengthening to a tropical cyclone, Cyclone Idai first hit Mozambique, in the night of 14-15 March 2019, making landfall near Beira City (Sofala Province) and bringing torrential rain and winds to Sofala, Zambezia, Manica and Tete provinces.¹⁶ It then continued as a tropical storm, bringing more rain to southern Malawi and striking eastern Zimbabwe (particularly Chimanimani and Chipinge districts) with heavy precipitation and wind.¹⁷¹⁸ Exactly six weeks after Cyclone Idai's landfall in Beira City, Tropical Cyclone Kenneth made landfall in Cabo Delgado Province in northern Mozambique, destroying villages and further impeding the country's ability to respond to the existing crisis.¹⁹ Two tropical cyclones striking Mozambique in the same season was a first in recorded history.²⁰

Prior to cyclones Idai and Kenneth, the succession of extreme weather conditions in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi over the past decade along with the difficult living conditions have eroded households' resilience to shocks and ability to cope with financial hardship. As such, even before Cyclone Idai hit Malawi, more than 3.3 million people were

¹² UNOCHA, "Mozambique: Cyclone Idai & Floods Situation Report No. 19 (As of 29 April 2019)."

¹³ MercyCorps, "Quick Facts: Cyclone Idai's Effect on Southern Africa," 2019, <https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/cyclone-idai-quick-facts>.

¹⁴ Oxfam, "Cyclone Idai in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe," 2019.

¹⁵ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, "IASC Operational Peer Review: Mozambique: Cyclone Idai Response.," n.d.

¹⁶ UNOCHA, "Mozambique: Cyclone Idai & Floods Situation Report No. 10," Situation Report, April 11, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-cyclone-idai-floods-situation-report-no-10-11-april-2019>.

¹⁷ UNOCHA, "Zimbabwe: Emergency Situation Report No. 8," Situation Report, May 22, 2019.

¹⁸ UNICEF, "Malawi Humanitarian Situation Report - Flood Situation Report," Situation Report, March 29, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/unicef-malawi-humanitarian-situation-report-flood-situation-report-no3-22-29-march>.

¹⁹ UNOCHA, "Southern Africa: Cyclones Idai and Kenneth Snapshot, as of 10 July 2019," Relief Web, July 10, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/southern-africa-cyclones-idai-and-kenneth-snapshot-10-july-2019>.

²⁰ Humanitarian Country Team and UNOCHA, "Humanitarian Response Plan (Revised Following Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, May 2019)."

already food insecure in flood-affected areas.²¹ Similarly, the markets of Mozambique were suffering from steep price inflation in the years that preceded the disaster, and Zimbabwe has experienced foreign currency shortages while its economy has been on a downward trend since 2015.²²²³ Cyclones Idai and Kenneth have therefore come to further aggravate the economic situations of affected households.

A key consequence of Cyclone Idai was damage to or complete destruction of homes, hospitals, roads, schools, and farms. Safe water and sanitation were compromised, resulting in a subsequent cholera outbreak in Mozambique, and access to health services was limited or non-existent. Households lost food, documents, and other assets; and protection risks increased, particularly for persons with disabilities (PWD), older persons (OP) and children.²⁴²⁵ The violence of the storm and resulting loss of family members, homes, and livelihoods was extremely traumatic, creating a need for psychosocial support services. Hundreds of thousands of people were also displaced and gathered in transit camps, with little to no access to clean water or food assistance, and suffering from high risk of waterborne diseases.²⁶ In Mozambique, the temporary accommodation and transit camps were abruptly closed, while the government opened 63 permanent resettlement sites in which 66,118 internally displaced people now live.²⁷ Many of these permanent resettlement sites lack basic services, including latrines and water provision.²⁸ Thousands of people who were affected by the storm and remain in their home communities live in remote areas that are difficult for humanitarian agencies to access.

Humanitarian actors involved in the response are now prioritising food, shelter, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and health needs of affected populations, with activities including water trucking to communities lacking access to clean and safe water; building toilets and handwashing facilities to reduce the risk of cholera and other diseases; distributing emergency shelter materials and non-food items (NFIs); distributing food, seeds and tools; and providing urgent health assistance.²⁹³⁰

²¹ Department of Disaster Management Affairs, "Malawi: Floods Response Situation Report No. 5," Situation Report (United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator, May 20, 2019).

²² Post- Cyclone Idai Cabinet for Reconstruction, "Mozambique Cyclone Idai Post Disaster Needs Assessment (Conference Version May 2019)," n.d., https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_704475.pdf.

²³ "The World Bank in Zimbabwe - Overview," The World Bank, October 31, 2018, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zimbabwe/overview>.

²⁴ Humanitarian Country Team and UNOCHA, "Humanitarian Response Plan (Revised Following Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, May 2019)."

²⁵ USAID, "SOUTHERN AFRICA - TROPICAL CYCLONE IDAI - FACT SHEET #9 FY2019."

²⁶ Post- Cyclone Idai Cabinet for Reconstruction, "Mozambique Cyclone Idai Post Disaster Needs Assessment (Conference Version May 2019)."

²⁷ UNHCR, "Tropical Cyclone Idai: Mozambique Situation Report #18 Reporting Period: 1 - 14 July 2019," July 16, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70322.pdf>.

²⁸ Unicef, "20190702 Resettlements WASH Mapping," n.d.


²⁹ UNICEF, "Malawi Humanitarian Situation Report - Flood Situation Report"; World Vision, "WorldVision_DEC_Ph1_Plan_CIA19_Moz," April 30, 2019.

³⁰ DEC, "CIA19_Phase 1 Plans_ Consolidated Outputs," n.d.

1.2. Response of DEC members

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) is an umbrella group of 14 UK aid charities, which coordinates and launches collective appeals to raise funds to provide emergency aid and rapid relief to people caught up in disasters and crises in the world’s poorest countries. It is


Figure 1: DEC funding per country



governed by a board of member trustees (chief executives of member organisations) and independent trustees, which aim to ensure accountability of the DEC operations. The DEC is part of a broader collection of humanitarian coalitions which is called the Emergency Appeals Alliance (EAA). As of 2019, DEC members include: Action Aid, Action Against Hunger, Age International, British Red Cross (BRC), CAFOD, CARE International, Christian Aid, Concern, Islamic Relief, Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children, Tearfund, and World Vision. Since it was formed in 1963, the DEC launched 72 appeals, raising overall more than 1.5 billion GBP.

The total DEC appeal funds allocated to Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe for the Phase One of the response is 14,660,429GBP.³¹ The breakdown of funds between the three affected countries is indicated in the below infographic; across all three countries, the greatest sectoral share of funding was in livelihoods (24% of all funding) and WASH (22%). Overall, both sectors were a bit less than half of the response.

Figure 2: Breakdown of the response per sector



³¹ DEC. “Cyclone Idai Appeal Consolidated Finance – Phase 1 Plans,” n.d.

Thirteen of the fourteen DEC members responded to the crisis. Overall, DEC's ambition is to reach 759,367 people, during Phase One of the response.³² Of the thirteen agencies, Oxfam had the largest target number of beneficiaries (211,929 across all three countries). The below table presents the breakdown of beneficiaries per country and agency:

Figure 3: Breakdown of beneficiaries per country and agency³³

DEC member	Malawi	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Total
Oxfam GB	30 878	37 001	144 050	211 929
Save the Children UK	31 000	48 000	83 000	162 000
British Red Cross	-	-	94 500	94 500
ActionAid	5 000	-	19 493	24 493
World Vision	41 000	18 875	43 160	103 035
CARE International UK	-	-	15 000	15 000
Plan International	26 460	-	7 072	33 532
Age International	9 549	3 750	5 100	18 399
CAFOD	-	15 000	3 610	18 610
Tearfund	12 751	-	-	12 751
Christian Aid	20 148	7 320	-	27 468
Concern Worldwide	27 650	-	-	27 650
Islamic Relief	10 000	-	-	10 000
Total	214 436	129 946	414 985	759 367

DEC members' areas of response include:

- In Mozambique: Beira district as well as Sofala and Manica provinces;
- In Zimbabwe: Chipinge, Chimanimani, Buhera districts of Manicaland province;
- In Malawi: Nsanje, Chikwawa, Phalombe, Blantyre, Mulanje, Zomba, Machinga and Mangochi in the southern part of Malawi and Balaka in the central part of the country.³⁴


DEC-funded programmes are implemented over two phases: Phase One, for the first six months of the response starting from March 2019 until 30 September 2019, and Phase Two, which will likely last for another 2.5 years. A crisis timeline is available in the below figure:

³² DEC.

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Maps indicating the exact areas of intervention are available in each country report.

Figure 4: Crisis timeline



DEC Phase One targets activities related to WASH, livelihoods, food security, shelter, NFI, protection, and health. These activities are delivered either in-kind or through cash and voucher assistance (CVA).³⁵

1.3. Longer-term development efforts

Prior to Cyclone Idai, some DEC members were operating in the districts/provinces that were later most affected by the cyclone. The table below presents the activities of each DEC member, as well as their country and district of operation:

Table 1 Long-term efforts by DEC members

DEC Member	Country	District/s	Longer term programming in affected area prior to Cyclone Idai
Action Aid	Zimbabwe	Chimanimani	Women entrepreneurship and life skills
	Mozambique	Sofala	Land deeds; community association support
Christian Aid	Zimbabwe	Chipinge	Prevention of gender-based violence (GBV)
Concern Worldwide	Malawi		Four-year program on resilience building through a consortium: assisting farming households on crop diversification, livestock

³⁵ DEC considers CVA as a sector, however, the consultants decided to consider CVA as a modality, that can be used across sectors.

			production, irrigation farming, and market access for the farmers.
Age International & ASADEC	Mozambique	Sofala	OP and PWD support
KfW	Mozambique	Sofala	Latrines; possibly other sanitation activities
Plan International	Malawi	Machinga and Zomba.	Lean season response and prevention of child marriage
Save the Children	Zimbabwe	Chipinge and Chimanimani	Child Protection
Tearfund	Malawi		Resilience-building interventions with a contingency plan allocation within the program as crisis-triggering modifiers
World Vision	Zimbabwe	Chipinge and Chimanimani	Food security, nutrition, livelihoods, community assets creation
	Malawi	Zomba and Machinga	WASH, food and nutrition security intervention
	Mozambique	Sofala & Manica	Health and nutrition activities

II. Review purpose, objectives and scope

The primary purpose of the real-time review (RTR) was to instigate collective real-time reflection and learning to inform programmatic adjustments across DEC members' response. The review drew on the initial phase of the response in order to generate lessons that will be applied in real time as well as during the second phase (month seven onwards) of the members' programmes. The response review also serves an accountability function, both to communities and people affected by crisis as well as to the UK public. The review is participatory and aims to be user-oriented. The target audience for this report includes the affected communities, UK public, DEC members and their partners, the governments of all three affected countries (Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique), and the local authorities in each of them.

Reviews on DEC members' responses were conducted in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. For each country, the consultants wrote country-specific reports following the same structure as this synthesis report (hereafter, referred to as 'country reports'). The present report endeavours not to repeat the findings of each country report but rather aims to present the major trends and provide more macro-level analysis.

The objectives of this response review were to:

- Draw out key learning and recommendations from the response to date, to inform Phase Two plans;

- Provide an overview and assessment of the response so far of DEC member agencies with a focus on relevance, sustainability, accountability, coordination, adaptability and effectiveness;
- Identify good practices in the humanitarian operations funded by the DEC;
- Identify priority areas, gaps, and areas of unmet needs;
- Highlight challenges that may affect implementation and programme quality.

The review focused on the activities and decisions conducted during Phase One of the response. The review aims to cover all activities undertaken by DEC members in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Considering that some DEC members partnered with members of the Humanitarian Coalition, the review will, to some extent, touch upon some of their activities.³⁶

The review strove to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent is the response relevant and appropriate to the needs and priorities of the target population?
2. How effective and efficient is the project in achieving its intended outcomes?
3. How adaptable has the response been so far?
4. How are DEC members ensuring accountability to affected populations?
5. How sustainable and connected to longer-term issues has the Phase One of the intervention been?
6. How are DEC members maximising coordination, partnerships and complementarity with other organisations to achieve the intended response outcomes?

The response review matrix is available in [Annex XI.2](#).

III. Methodology

The review adopted a participatory and use-oriented approach, in which as much emphasis was put on the process as on the final output (i.e. the report). The methodology involved a desk review and inception phase followed by primary data collection in three countries. The review used Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIs). Primary data collection was followed by a learning and feedback workshop in each country. After each learning workshop, Key Aid conducted data analysis and reporting. The figure below shows the methodology employed for the review. Detailed methodology is available in [Annex XI.3](#)

³⁶ The Humanitarian Coalition is a coalition of 10 Canadian non-governmental organisations, aiming to unite efforts to raise funds in a simple and effective way to help during international humanitarian disasters. The coalition is governed by a board of Directors, made up of the respective executive directors of each member agency. The Humanitarian Coalition is part along various other coalitions of the EAA. As of 2019, members of the Humanitarian Coalition include Action Against Hunger, Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Canadian Lutheran World Relief, CARE Canada, Humanity & Inclusion, Islamic Relief Canada, Oxfam Canada, Oxfam Québec, Plan International Canada, and Save the Children Canada. Since its creation in 2010, the Humanitarian Coalition has responded to 12 major emergencies and raised 75 million CAD.

Figure 5: Methodology


Inception phase & desk review	Inception report	Desk review	
	<p>Briefing with DEC Secretariat (3 June)</p> <p>Review tools development (interview questionnaires etc.)</p>	Comprehensive and structured review of about a hundred documents (projects information and relevant external documentation)	
Data collection	<p>Mozambique</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 July: Country briefing workshop with 25 participants from 15 organisations 10 FGDs with 104 people in total 38 KIIs from 3-11 July 2019 with representatives from 9 DEC members, 9 partners, 3 coordinating bodies, government agencies, and donors 12 July: Learning workshop in Beira with 18 participants from 11 organisations 	<p>Malawi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4 July: Country briefing workshop in Lilongwe with 16 participants from 9 organisations 8 FGDs with 123 people in total 19 KIIs from 4-26 July 2019 with representatives from 7 DEC members, 2 partners, 2 coordinating bodies, government agencies, and donors 19 July: Learning workshop in Lilongwe with 12 participants from 8 organisations 	<p>Zimbabwe</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5 July: Country briefing workshop in Mutare with 25 participants from 10 organisations 12 FGDs with 110 people in total 25 KIIs from 8 to 20 July 2019 with representatives from 7 DEC members, 4 partners, 4 coordinating bodies, government agencies and donors 19 July: Learning workshop in Mutare with 19 participants from 12 organisations
	Total 421 individuals consulted during data collection (419 as part of data collection in country and 2 KIIs at global level)		
Final report	Data coding and analysis	<p>First draft: 11 August 2019</p> <p>Final draft: 30 August 2019</p>	
Review limits	<p>Due to time and resources constraints, it was not possible to conduct primary data collection with beneficiaries from all affected districts.</p> <p>Due to availability constraints, it was not always possible to interview a representative from every DEC member agency intervening in each country.</p> <p>In Zimbabwe, a member of the Office of the President Cabinet was present during the whole primary data collection phase.</p>		

IV. The relevance and appropriateness of the response over time

IV.1. Geographical Targeting of DEC members' activities

Overall, geographical targeting of areas of interventions was considered to be relevant to the crisis. All areas of interventions of DEC members overlap with the areas hit by the cyclone indicated in the below figure. Inclusion error (areas that were not heavily affected receiving interventions) was not cited as a problem of this response.

Figure 6: Cyclone-affected areas across Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi (Source: UNOCHA)



Nonetheless, some areas of intervention for the Cyclone Idai response were also selected on the basis of access and previous knowledge and experience in the area. As a result, some key informants noted a disparity in the strength of the response between different localities.

In Buzi District (Mozambique), most of the response activities were concentrated in the more accessible locations, while areas such as Bandua and Estaquinha, much less accessible to vehicles due to the storm's destruction, had only one DEC agency operating. Similarly, in Malawi, some key informants reported that because DEC members chose their areas of intervention based on accessibility and where they had longer-term programmes, some districts were less served than others. Specific areas within districts such as Traditional Authority (TA) Makanga in Nsanje District, where support required airlifting or the use of boats, had less support coverage than others.

IV.2. Sectoral priorities

Across all three countries, DEC members made a deliberate effort to accurately assess the needs of populations affected by the disaster. All of the DEC members reportedly used participatory needs assessment to inform the sectoral priorities. Some of the organizations conducted assessments prior to the start of giving services, while others relied on the multi-sector assessments conducted by others. In Malawi, three out of the nine DEC members involved in the response contributed to the Government Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA).


Most of the assessments shared with the review team did gather information on protection issues facing the population, although some of it was quite thin. This was then used to tailor the responses to distinct needs and vulnerabilities of different groups. In various instances, a strong focus was put on the needs of children (safe spaces, school building support, nutrition screening), pregnant and lactating mothers (nutrition support), reproductive health and women specific needs (provision of menstrual hygiene management materials), and disability (which is one of the vulnerability criteria for food assistance). For instance, assessments conducted by DEC members in Mozambique and shared with the consultants identified differing needs of different groups in communities, such as female-headed households, OP and PWD. Similarly, DEC members' assessments conducted in Malawi included protection concerns (though there was no protection section per se). It must however be noted that interviewed OP often had the perception that that their issues were not prioritised and that DEC members should endeavour to mainstream OP-specific issues in their programming (which was especially the case in Zimbabwe).

The sectors that received the most funding were not always those that were deemed a priority by inter-agency need assessments or during FGDs. In particular, as indicated in Figure 5 below, livelihoods was one of the most funded sectors in Mozambique and Malawi, despite activities not always aligning with the seasonal calendar and not including pest control in districts that were subsequently heavily affected by fall armyworm. There was also a discrepancy between the strong focus on livelihoods activities and the needs expressed during FGDs, where WASH and shelter were often cited as priorities. In particular, in Mozambique shelter was surprisingly only the fifth-most funded sector.³⁷ Several reasons

³⁷ DEC, "Cyclone Idai Appeal Consolidated Finance - Phase 1 Plans," n.d.

may nonetheless explain why livelihoods was prioritised over other sectors, such as the fact that DEC funding is flexible and that other funds may be covering other sectoral needs.

Figure 7: DEC funding per sector per country



In Malawi, it was difficult for the consultants to determine the extent to which the sectoral priorities of the DEC members were aligned with those identified in the PDNA and voiced by crisis-affected households, as 27% of programme-related funding was allocated under “CVA”, not under a given sectoral or multisectoral outcome.

Across all countries under study, respondents and communities interviewed felt that available funding was too little to cover the variety and scope of needs. Unmet needs included shelter (particularly permanent shelter materials), clothing, and the provision of heavy infrastructure such as roads and bridges (which are beyond DEC members’ mandate and budgets). Interestingly, communities often identified their needs going forward and were concerned with recovery-focused issues.

IV.3. Link between outputs and results

The comparison between the members’ intended outcomes and planned outputs demonstrates an overwhelming logical link both across sectors and between DEC members. The review team did not find any activities planned that did not logically feed into the intended results. Survey respondents and informants also agreed that the design of the cyclone response is consistent with the overall goal and objectives.

On specific instances, however, the outputs planned appeared to be limited to meet the intended outcomes. For instance, in Mozambique, WASH outcomes were only related to water supply and had no sanitation or hygiene promotion activities. Similarly, livelihoods

rehabilitation outcomes included seed distribution outputs but no pest control, a serious limitation in light of fall armyworm infestation.

On the other hand, in Malawi specific activities were not only aligned with the expected outcomes but also aligned with the cluster requirements. For example in TA Nkhulambe in Phalombe District, the affected communities benefited from cash and agricultural input in form of short cycled seeds and drought tolerant crops. One organisation promoted in parallel the use of organic and semi-organic manure as recommended by the Livelihoods Cluster.

V. Effectiveness of the project in achieving its intended outcomes

V.1. LFA planned outcomes and achievements at time of RTR

The response review was mainly qualitative and did not focus on quantitative monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data. Considering that M&E data was not available for all countries, it is difficult for the consultants to make a definitive judgement on the achievement of outputs and outcomes. Yet key informants from DEC agencies, across all three countries, were confident that the planned outcomes were being achieved, with the exception of some delays and adaptations based on changing circumstances. Similarly, although they indicated avenues for improvement such as an increase in the provision of food aid, discussions with the communities gave qualitative confirmation of the satisfaction of affected communities who received assistance from DEC members. A detailed list of achievements per sector is available in each country report. One area where DEC members have been reported to be particularly effective was in helping swiftly contain a cholera epidemic in Mozambique.

V.2. Timeliness and quality of the response

The timely delivery of assistance was area-, organisation-, sector-, and modality-specific. The response in Malawi was reportedly provided on time, especially for shelter and food sectors. Key informants indicated that timely delivery was often possible in instances where agencies had enough start-up funds to initiate the response and/or had pre-existing stock. Nonetheless, across countries, key informants and communities reported some delays in procurement processes due to legal requirements, lack of access to some areas of intervention (particularly in Malawi), and issues with disbursement procedures. As such, some shelter distributions in Mozambique have not yet started. Such issues with procurement raised questions amongst the consultants regarding the extent to which implementing organisations had a clear understanding of how local markets function.

The timeliness of the response also depended on the modality used by the organisation. Agencies who used cash grants reported more delays than those using in-kind. This can be the result of a lack of experience and preparedness at agency level (e.g. lack of framework agreements with Financial Service Providers). Organisations working in less-accessible areas took more time in starting their activities. Finally, external factors have influenced the timely delivery of assistance. For instance, one agency in Malawi reported they had to wait before providing agriculture inputs until the water levels had reduced to a level where farmers could start replanting, to avoid further loss of the seeds.

Similarly, it is difficult for the consultants to reach conclusions regarding the overall quality of the programmes, considering the wide variety of projects implemented. Overall quality and diversity of the assistance provided was deemed good both by key informants and crisis-affected households. Nonetheless, some issues with the quality of the hybrid seeds distributed in Mozambique were reported, as was a quality gap for referrals to health services for patients with chronic illnesses, nutrition patients, and, potentially, for GBV survivors.

V.3. Adaptability of the response

Agility and adaptability have been mentioned as a strong suit of the response. One of the primary reasons for it was the flexibility of DEC funding, which was highly regarded by all DEC member agency key informants. This flexibility was cited as a strength given the fluid nature of emergencies, changing beneficiary needs, and the uncertain political and macro-economic situation in each country.

This flexibility in the funding allowed organisations to:

- Change the geographical scope of the response to increase coverage and reduce duplication. For example, BRC decided to concentrate on Dondo District instead of Buzi when they found that enough organizations were operating there.
- Decide on new activities on the basis of changing needs. CARE used funding originally allocated to latrine desludging to construct new school latrines when it was found that there was a much greater need for new latrines than there was for latrines that needed to be desludged.
- Adjust activities based on the physical access, the context, market functionality, and government regulations. For example, ActionAid and CAFOD changed the content of hygiene kits and shelter kits due to feedback from beneficiaries and due to changed circumstances.
- Transforming modus operandi to increase sustainability. For example, Save the Children transferred their mobile health clinics to the government mobile brigade and is repairing government ambulances.

Data collection revealed that barriers DEC members had in adapting their programmes were related to costs and DEC members' mandates. Indeed, key achievements that could greatly benefit beneficiaries such as roads and bridges fall outside of the DEC members' mandate.

In addition, DEC members face budget constraints that sometimes impede them from addressing key issues such as permanent shelter solutions.

V.4. Factors influencing project success

Cyclone Idai interventions across the three countries faced some context-specific peculiarities that either hampered or facilitated the success of the response. The below have been highlighted by the interviewed DEC members.

Table 2: Summary of facilitating and blocking factors across countries of intervention³⁸

Location	Facilitating factors	Blocking factors
Across countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Experience and expertise of staff • Using community-based approach and community participation as a way to orient the programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to populations living in remote areas and localising such populations • High turnover of international staff • Quick closing of camps and rushed return of households
Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working through pre-existing consortia • Using pre-positioned stocks • Presence of community associations & churches in community that are able to assist OP and facilitate the creation of local partnerships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Import regulations and availability • Election (past and upcoming), which have the potential to politicise aid and worsen community relations and trust • Cyclone Kenneth • Cholera outbreak • Armyworm infestation • Language barriers
Zimbabwe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Start-up funds 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only one logistics centre • Changes in currency regulation • Lack of pre-positioned stocks
Malawi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working with local partners and pre-existing WASH committees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security situation with elections held in May 2019 that led to violent protests and increased insecurity • Evacuation centres located in schools, further disrupting education

³⁸ Source is primary data collection

VI. Accountability to affected population

Accountability is a key element of any DEC-funded intervention. All DEC members have an agreed-upon Accountability Framework. As part of their organisational commitments towards accountability, all DEC members are using the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance provided.³⁹

VI.1. Communities' involvement in the response

In line with their CHS commitments, DEC members across all countries of intervention put in place thorough measures to ensure community participation across the project cycle. The views of crisis-affected households were taken into consideration in the assessment phase through gender-segregated need assessments. Key examples of community participation included:

- Ensuring that community leaders were involved in the design of the project;
- Holding FGDs and/or community meetings with community members to discuss the design of activities and the choice of modality, as well as content of the kits distributed. Age International even did door-to-door consultation for those crisis-affected household members with limited mobility;
- Implementing interventions through existing committees (i.e. water committees for WASH interventions in Malawi);
- Ensuring awareness on the importance of community participation. The Red Cross in Mozambique, for instance, created a partnership with the anthropology department in a Maputo-based university to develop a cultural awareness briefing package for national and international staff involved in the response.

However how much real or perceived decision-making power community members wield is unclear, but some of the organizations are focusing heavily on community engagement and participatory response. Having people from the community engaged in the design and delivery (via leaders and volunteers' involvement) makes the process consultative, but this should be balanced with the risks linked to the potential or perceived bias it may create. For example, this was flagged as a risk with Camp Committees in Nsanje District (Malawi) who reportedly did not understand their roles in the camps and, potentially, the correct and appropriate criteria for the selection of beneficiaries.

Across all countries, the vast majority of FGDs participants knew why they were part of the programme and understood that interventions targeted specific groups. FGD participants understood that the basis for receiving aid was the extent to which a household would have been affected negatively by the cyclone as well as the wealth status of the household. Despite this, some contention existed between beneficiaries regarding the extent to which

³⁹ <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/the-standard>

the targeting was fair (especially for food assistance in Zimbabwe). This created frustration and potential tension due to the fact that there was no uniform understanding of the food aid ration sizes per beneficiary or household.

VI.2. Complaints and Feedback Mechanisms

DEC members across countries have endeavoured to ensure that multiple complaint channels were available to beneficiaries of their programmes. These complaints and feedback mechanisms (CFM) often ranged from confidential to more public mechanisms, including suggestion boxes and toll-free numbers, and face-to-face mechanisms such help desks, local beneficiary committees, contact numbers for agency staff, and use of local leadership. However, beneficiary awareness regarding the existence of such CFMs differed greatly depending on the location. In a few of the FGDs conducted in Mozambique, none of the participants knew of any of such mechanisms or understood how they functioned.

Although only a small number of beneficiaries interviewed reported using any of the mechanisms to submit a complaint, some reported that when they did, measures were taken on the basis of the feedback received. In Nsanje District (Malawi), for instance, one committee that helped with the targeting of beneficiaries was re-elected on the basis of the feedback received by Christian Aid.

Preferred feedback mechanisms were face-to-face feedback methods, which allowed for dialogue and interaction, as well as suggestion boxes in Zimbabwe, which allowed for privacy and confidentiality. However, suggestion boxes raise the issue of literacy and equal accessibility across gender, due to potential discrepancies between male and female literacy rates in some locations.⁴⁰ On the other hand, complaint mechanisms operated through the phone were often considered less accessible due to limited access to telephones and/or mobile network.

In Malawi, communities were informed of which conduct they should expect from staff and volunteers. However, it is unclear whether communities benefitting from DEC programmes in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were also made aware of appropriate humanitarian agency conduct.

VI.3. Evaluation against the CHS

Cyclone Idai disrupted communications infrastructure, limited physical access to affected communities and, as such, made it more complicated to deliver an accountable response. This was especially the case for DEC members which do not have a static presence in communities. These members have to rely on their implementing partner staff or community volunteers to pass on messages when they are not there, and there is an inherent risk of information loss when passing through multiple layers.

⁴⁰ In Malawi, for instance, overall literacy rate is 62%, but 70% amongst men and 55% amongst women.

DEC members are exploring how to adapt communications to the channels which have been traditionally used to convey messages. Notably, some of the agencies are looking at using radio messaging as an additional channel of communicating to communities. Using this type of communication would reduce some of the burden that partners face in communicating in areas where there is no static presence and with populations unlikely to be around during community meetings. Communication should be used as a two-way mechanism to ensure crisis-affected households are both aware of the assistance provided and able to provide feedback to contribute to monitoring efforts. This requires certain resources both human and financial, yet DEC representatives interviewed felt they did not have a sufficient budget to fund multiple CFMs or M&E processes which can measure accountability to affected population (AAP), such as post-distribution monitoring.

Figure 8: CHS Commitments




Figure 8 indicates CHS Commitments. The colours have been changed in order to represent which standards need the most attention, based on the findings of this review. The standards that appear the least met are coloured in orange and red (orange meaning partially met and red meaning not met at all), according to the consultants' judgement. Standards that appear in grey are those that have not been measured. Each country report includes a detailed evaluation of DEC's programmes based on those criteria.

VII. Sustainability and connectedness of the response

Across the three countries of intervention, Phase One was designed as an emergency response. As such, it (rightly) focused on the provision of assistance aiming to cover basic needs. There were no disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities in any of the countries of intervention. Nonetheless, this does not mean that long-term needs were not included in the response.

The strong focus on livelihoods activities across all countries of intervention is a good indicator of DEC members' willingness to pave the way to early recovery. DEC members consistently across contexts included activities that aimed to prepare the country for longer-term needs. Such activities include sensitizing women and caregivers on nutrition, building

permanent community infrastructure such as school latrines, and supporting affected households to construct and/or rehabilitate more resistant houses with iron sheets.

In Malawi, many humanitarian actors including DEC members are now considering engaging with social protection programmes. A good illustration of this willingness is the attempt by the Cash Working Group (co-chaired by Concern Worldwide) to liaise with the Social Protection Technical Working Group.⁴¹

Beyond this, various DEC members have endeavoured to link emergency and longer-term programmes. For instance, in Malawi, Concern Worldwide and Tearfund are considering affected farmers in their longer-term projects that include resilience building through crop diversification, irrigation farming, livestock production, and market access programs. Similarly, Save the Children is considering extending Village Savings and Loans (VSL) activities to Cyclone Idai-affected areas.

One of the main barriers to closer links between emergency response and longer-term development efforts was the lack of involvement of development team members in the design and implementation of the Phase One of the response. A notable exception is the COSACA consortium in Mozambique, which had Save the Children, Oxfam, and CARE as part of the DEC response, and which was able to share information with partners who were new to the locations, and which has a coordinator who has been in Mozambique for several years.

The environment is a particularly relevant cross-cutting issue when looking at cyclone responses. As for an earthquake, the destruction of infrastructure following a cyclone may increase pollution levels in the atmosphere and water.⁴² However, this is still a topic that is given a low priority overall by humanitarians. Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe DEC responses are no exception and most key informants did not have information on the environmental impact of the response (i.e. how their activities affect the environment).

Those who did talk about the environment only mentioned that they were considering how to incorporate building back better (BBB) and DRR in their shelter and livelihoods activities, especially as the threat of future cyclones remains high for these communities. The assessments reviewed, too, did not discuss environmental impact, though a few did mention that climate change and future storms were important factors to consider. Only one DEC member agency, the Red Cross, is formally assessing the environmental impact of its activities with an external consultant conducting a “green review”, which looks at both internal operations (e.g. fleet and fuel use, paper) and activities with beneficiaries.⁴³

⁴¹ Minutes of the Cash Working Group (CWG) Meeting – 25th June 2019

⁴² H.Juillard and J.Jourdain, 2018, Earthquake lesson paper, ALNAP

⁴³The green review was described during a KII with one Red Cross staff and subsequently confirmed by another staff later.

VIII. Coordination and complementarity

Coordination mechanisms vary significantly from one country to another:

- In Mozambique, the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) is the governmental body in charge of natural disaster prevention and mitigation. After Cyclone Idai, the Government of Mozambique activated the Emergency Operation Centre (COE), a provincial level body which is coordinated by the prime minister, as well as the Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC). The CTGC exists at community and district levels and is part of INGC. Along with the line Ministries and the UN Humanitarian Country Team, the CTGC decides on the response strategy. Coordination is primarily done from Beira, where all major clusters are active. At the government-level, coordination takes place in Portuguese whereas coordination is in English at the country-level.
- In Zimbabwe, the main coordination bodies at national, provincial and district levels are instituted by the Government. At provincial and district levels, the civil protection unit (CPU) is the main coordinating body for the response. The Provincial Administrator runs the provincial CPU whilst the District Administrators head the district CPUs.
- In Malawi, the Cyclone Idai response is coordinated by the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) through the Principal Secretary (PS) in the Office of President and Cabinet (OPC). All of the main clusters are active in-country (e.g. Shelter, WASH, Protection, Food Security). The response is coordinated at both district-level through the district councils and national-level through the line Ministries. Interviewed District Social Welfare Officers and DEC agencies reported good attendance by DEC members at the coordination meetings.

As such, DEC members in each country face a different set of issues related to coordination. In Mozambique, key informants reported that the major barriers to coordination were two-fold. First, language is reported to be an issue, with some meetings held in Portuguese and others English, and as many staff are not comfortable in both languages. Second, many informants reported a lack of familiarity with the cluster system and found it hard to navigate, which resulted in some partners not being very active in the coordination fora.

Informants in Zimbabwe reported a different set of issues. For them, the most important challenge was the numerous layers of coordination in place at the beginning of the response, with coordination meetings that were up to four or five per day. For Malawi, informants reported gaps in district level coordination as well as delays to set up the coordination of the response. For instance, the 4W matrix came in after organisations started to implement their activities on the ground. Similarly, cash amounts currently differ across agencies, due to delay in guidance from the Cash Working Group.

Overall, informants reported regular participation of DEC members in coordination meetings and a willingness to share information.

None of the DEC members interviewed reported participating in DEC-specific coordination meetings. In fact, the RTR workshops were often the first occasions DEC members had to meet and discuss as DEC since the start of the response. Informants did not have the intention to create an extra layer of coordination at DEC-level, yet many DEC members also demonstrated some appetite for more horizontal learning opportunities and for better alignment of funding efforts. DEC member agency staff found the sharing of ideas and challenges as DEC members in the RTR workshops to be beneficial and expressed the desire to continue doing so, potentially with future learning and planning workshops.

Because there is a higher level of trust amongst DEC members (mainly due to funding mechanisms), they tend to share information informally. In Malawi, some DEC informants reported that in areas where DEC members' operations overlapped, they were to a great extent complementary, and bilateral synergies were created. This was especially the case in Chikwawa, where two agencies held bilateral meetings to iron out issues on overlapping interventions.

Data collected for this project also revealed that there was no specific information management for sharing assessment reports and plans in real-time.

IX. Conclusion

Cyclone response presents unique challenges: physical access is difficult in the first few days and communication is constrained by infrastructure destruction. In spite of those challenges, DEC's response to the Cyclone Idai can be considered a success, in so far that it provided a flexible source of funds that allowed members to adapt their responses quickly to changing circumstances, addressed the needs that the targeted communities expressed as being the most relevant, and made efforts to build accountability to the affected populations into the response. One of the DEC response's strengths was that the diversity of its members allowed for an array of best practices and lessons learned to be seen in this review, saving other members time and effort in identifying better ways to implement. DEC funding is the ninth largest source of funding for the appeal in Mozambique and the fifth in Zimbabwe, hence making significant contributions towards covering crisis-affected households' needs.⁴⁴

Across the three countries, but especially in Mozambique, Phase One response is unique as it presents a strong focus on livelihoods. This raises the interesting question of the universal hierarchy of needs, which is often critiqued for being externally-imposed/not culturally relevant. There is and will always be an inherent tension between the needs (i.e. what "expert" opinion deems necessary) and the demand (i.e. what people have the capacity to meet, but as importantly, the willingness to acquire). Humanitarian organisations tend to look at relevance from an agency-centric perspective (even when consulting with crisis-affected households, organisations are always bound by agency mandate/expertise). The sectoral prioritisation of the response in the Cyclone Idai response tends to demonstrate that DEC members have done things differently, prioritising those needs expressed by the

⁴⁴ Source : Financial Tracking Services, UNOCHA

crisis-affected households. These strong roots in the local contexts are to be further explored when it comes to how the market functions and how private sector efforts can be supported (or at least not undermined). This understanding can and should be developed pre-crisis, to increase the effectiveness and timeliness of future responses.

The response to Cyclone Idai also presents a great opportunity to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus and to operationalise the New Way of Working.⁴⁵ What DEC members have done organically, especially in Malawi, to increase coherence between humanitarian and development actions, should be capitalised upon and systematised going into Phase Two. The long-lasting presence of DEC members in Malawi is an asset that can be built upon so that crisis-affected households not only get back on their feet but are also integrated into longer-term resilience projects.

DEC members' global organisational commitment towards the CHS cascaded down at country level. The intended level of participation of the communities in the response was high from the start and aligned with CHS commitment. However, it should be further increased over time and after the first few weeks of the response (when the urgency of the needs requires swift action).

Cross-cutting issues such as gender and protection were incorporated at all stages of the response, but environmental considerations should be taken on board strongly. There is a high likelihood that environmental disasters will hit Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe again in the coming years, whether it be a drought in a coming agriculture season or another cyclone. Preparing for possible future disasters would help strengthen the gains made in this response and potentially protect people from the worst effects of another disaster.

X. Recommendations

On the basis of the above findings, the suggestions for DEC members to further strengthen their response to Cyclone Idai and future programming include:⁴⁶

X.1. Relevance and appropriateness

Recommendation 1: Look out for potential issues related to land tenure and lack of identification documents

Cyclones can have long lasting effects not only on households and infrastructures but also on access to necessary civil documentation. When a cyclone hits, households often lose identification documents while traditional landmarks can be washed away.⁴⁷ Yet to receive

⁴⁵ https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/NWOW%20Booklet%20low%20res.002_0.pdf

⁴⁶ The below set of recommendations is not a summary of the respective country-level recommendations, it is rather a reflection of those recommendations that are relevant across all three-countries.

⁴⁷ Brown O., (2006) Addressing Land Ownership after Natural Disasters. IISD. Accessed on August 9th 2019 https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/es_addressing_land.pdf

assistance, especially cash assistance, crisis-affected populations need to be able to demonstrate who they are, and to benefit from shelter repair and reconstruction, households need to present proof of land ownership.

It is likely that shelter will represent one of the priority sectors of Phase Two and that, at least in Malawi, the use of cash assistance will continue to grow. It is therefore recommended that DEC members anticipate issues related to land tenure by looking into how property is secured in each of the three contexts and the extent to which customary land occupation can be considered secure enough to embark into shelter repair and reconstruction. This would be especially relevant in Mozambique. The 1997 Mozambican Land Law allows women to be co-title holders to land deeds; however, customary practices, lack of access to formal courts, and lack of education in rural areas mean that in practice, women often do not have rights to land.⁴⁸ Property deeds are also an issue with the resettlement sites, as not all those who were promised land deeds by the government have received them yet.

Also, when using cash assistance, DEC members should assess the extent to which targeted households have access to identification documents and consider a wide array of delivery mechanisms so that even those without formal identification documents can access assistance.

Recommendation 2: Favour the repair of existing structures and advocate with the governments to turn to resettlement only as a last resort measure.

Both in Mozambique and Malawi, governments decided to strongly and rapidly push for the closure of the displacement sites that mushroomed after the cyclone. In Malawi, the government policy favours return to the area of origin, while in Mozambique the government established permanent resettlement sites to encourage people to move from low-lying land.

In some instances, resettlement is inevitable and the only way to mitigate against future disasters. Yet it has rarely proven successful as people tend to lack livelihood opportunities and social connections in the new areas.⁴⁹

DEC members should use prior experiences (e.g. in Haiti, in Pakistan) to advocate with the governments for resettlements to be considered only as a last resort measure. This is especially important as literature shows that poor populations are more vulnerable to be

⁴⁸ Anna Knox and Tanner, Christopher, "Securing Women's Land Rights in Mozambique," January 2011, <http://www.focusonland.com/countries/protecting-and-improving-womens-land-rights-in-mozambique/>; United States Agency for International Development, "Land Links: Mozambique Country Profile," n.d., <https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/mozambique/#1528831743941-041255bf-6778>.

⁴⁹ Clermont, C., with Sanderson, D., Sharma, A. and Spraos, H. (2011) Urban disasters – lessons from Haiti: study of member agencies' responses to the earthquake in Port Au Prince, Haiti, January 2010. DEC Accessed on August 9th 2019 <https://www.alnap.org/help-library/urban-disasters-%E2%80%99-lessons-from-haiti-study-of-member-agencies%E2%80%99-responses-to-the>

relocated as they are more likely to live in high-risk areas.⁵⁰ This advocacy can be a collective effort across DEC members.

Recommendation 3: Use transitional shelters with care and prioritise permanent shelter solutions.

Going forward, DEC members will likely integrate shelters as a key part of their response. Transitional shelters can be appropriate but usually with the condition that they are set up quickly after the disaster and within the framework of a broader reconstruction plan.⁵¹ As a result, DEC members, when looking at Phase Two, should favour more permanent shelter design to ensure greater sustainability of their interventions and their value for money in the long run. The flexibility of DEC funding represents a great opportunity to consider more permanent constructions than may be the case with traditional funding sources.

Recommendation 4: Consider conditional assistance for Phase One only, to support debris-clearing efforts.

Food for work and cash for work, which are forms of conditional assistance can be appropriate in the short term to support debris clearing, yet they cannot be considered either as a modality to be sustained nor to be scaled up.

Food and cash for work can disrupt local labour markets by attracting unskilled labour into less sustainable schemes. It can also disrupt livelihoods as households may be tempted to favour NGO-led food or cash work as opposed to their traditional livelihoods, which may be more sustainable but with a lower daily rate. Overall humanitarian organisations tend to be ill-prepared for large-scale food or cash for work schemes (e.g. health and safety of the worker, risks of child labour) which in turn make the use of these modalities riskier.

It is therefore recommended that DEC members consider the use of food and cash for work only with great care during Phase Two and rather favour unconditional modality.

X.2. Effectiveness and efficiency

Recommendation 5: DEC to track CVA as a modality not as a sector and ensure consistency with the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) glossary.

As of now, DEC is tracking CVA as a sector and not as a modality. That makes it difficult to track outcomes as cash is just a means to an end to cover sectoral and multi-sectoral needs. Furthermore, DEC and its members are using CVA-related terminology in a way that does not entirely align with the CaLP glossary, for example, by using “condition” and “restriction” inter-changeably.

It is therefore recommended for the DEC Secretariat and members to align their cash-related terminology with the CaLP glossary.⁵² It is also recommended for the DEC Secretariat

⁵⁰ Chen, K., with Zhang, Q. and Hsu, C. (2016) Earthquake lessons from China: coping and rebuilding strategies. Washington DC: IFPRI

⁵¹ Juillard H. with Jourdain J. (2018), Earthquake lessons paper, ALNAP.

⁵² <http://www.cashlearning.org/resources/glossary>

to change the way CVA is tracked and accounted for. Sectoral assistance should be tracked under each of the sectors, with a specific mention about the modality used (i.e. in-kind, voucher or cash). Multi-sectoral assistance can be accounted for separately. The decision on how to track and report on multipurpose cash assistance and their potential outcomes should be taken as a collective by DEC members.

Changing the way CVA is tracked would allow for better follow up of outcomes. In parallel with tracking outcomes (intended and actual), DEC members should also track the modality, so that they can report on their respective organizational commitments to increase CVA uptake. More information can be found on CaLP's thematic page on tracking cash and voucher assistance.⁵³

X.3. Coordination

Recommendation 6: Use DEC membership as an opportunity for horizontal learning and joint risk assessment, and explore better programme design alignment.

Being part of the DEC creates a certain degree of trust among its members that could be capitalised on to improve the effectiveness and accountability of the assistance delivered.

Given an opportunity during the review to share successes and challenges, DEC members expressed the wish to do so more frequently. Being conscious of the burdens of the teams, an option could be to meet on an ad hoc basis either on a specific theme or project cycle step. This learning workshop should be a safe space where partners can learn from each other but also plan together.

DEC membership could also be an interesting forum for joint risk assessment. Risk appetite will always be specific to organisations but risk assessment and discussion around mitigation measures can be done collectively among organisations who share a sufficient level of trust. One area for member agencies to discuss is the risk of shifting the power dynamics within communities if relying too much on the same community representatives.

As Phase One will be coming to an end in September, members could meet and plan for Phase Two, particularly to coordinate procurement, standardized referral processes, and conduct joint-market and other assessments as needed.

Recommendation 7: Ensure all DEC members and partner organizations know what DEC is.

DEC as a membership organization has a unique way of working. DEC and its members should not be considered a "traditional" funding organization. During the review, the interviewed partner organisations and some of the field-based staff of DEC members had little to no understanding of what DEC was. Similarly, knowledge of other DEC members and their respective plans is higher at headquarter level than at the field level. This presents a missed opportunity to fully take advantage of what the DEC membership has to offer. It is therefore recommended that as part of the start of all Phase Two projects, a short introduction to DEC is to be given to any members involved in the Cyclone Idai response.

⁵³ <http://www.cashlearning.org/thematic-area/tracking-cash--voucher-programming>

The field visit of the DEC Secretariat staff in the field can also be an opportunity to reiterate the DEC essence and ways of working.

X.4. Accountability to affected population

Recommendation 8: Ensure crisis-affected households have multiple channels to provide feedback and complaints.

Agencies should use multiple methods of getting feedback from communities. The diversity of mechanisms ensures that affected communities have choices and can choose mechanisms which best suit the type of feedback that they have. In the mix of feedback mechanisms, at least one should be completely confidential, such as toll-free numbers or suggestion boxes. This helps when communities have sensitive issues to share or fear victimisation and backlash. Confidential mechanisms should be set up early in the response. DEC member agencies need to ensure that all members of the communities are able to access at least one mechanism, taking into account the different needs and situations of groups such as children, PWD and OP.

Finally, DEC members should include questions on use of CFMs and the type of response received in their post-distribution monitoring and other assessments.

X.5. Sustainability

Recommendation 9: Analyse, use, and support markets including labour market.

There is growing consensus in the humanitarian sector on the need to be aware of local economies and local markets, i.e. being 'market sensitive'. Market assessment should form an integral part of situation analysis. This can be done prior to the crisis, especially in areas that are prone to disasters. Market functionality forms a pivotal element of cash feasibility and which market systems to assess can be determined on the basis of the key needs (e.g. food and shelter) that are likely to be affected as a result of a future drought or flood.

Beyond analysing markets, DEC members that have long-term programmes aiming at supporting value chains are encouraged to look at supporting markets beyond livelihood objectives. Market support intervention is an approach which aims to improve the situation of crisis-affected populations by providing support to critical market systems on which the target population relies for goods, services, labour or income. By strengthening key market systems after or prior to a crisis, households prone to disaster would be better able to cover their needs or access labour and incomes in case of a future flood or drought. The CaLP Market Support Interventions in Humanitarian Contexts tip sheet can be a good resource with which to start.⁵⁴

Market monitoring should then form an integral element of regular monitoring frameworks, to monitor the appropriateness of the modality used and of the transfer value distributed in

⁵⁴ <http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/resources/guidelines/calp-crs-tip-sheet-web.pdf>

the case of cash grants. As a minimum, market monitoring should look at price monitoring of the key commodities and the services crisis-affected households access with their cash grants (or those procured in-kind by DEC members). To support with setting up price monitoring, DEC members can use the MARKit guidance.⁵⁵

Recommendation 10: Define in a participatory manner what being resilient means.

Phase Two of the response should aim towards long-term effects and building “resilience”. Resilience has two primary purpose: i) the capacity to protect one’s capital and ii) to quickly recover after a shock. Yet the concept is not “one-size-fits-all” and should be envisioned in a context-specific manner, at different levels. Indeed, a sum of resilient individuals does not systematically lead to a resilient household, neither does a sum of resilient households lead to a resilient community. Links between community and individual resilience are not straightforward.⁵⁶

To ensure Phase Two projects are rooted into a concrete and actionable definition of resilience, DEC members are encouraged to collectively reflect on what make an individual resilient to drought and floods in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Those different factors can then be used as a starting point to define the Phase Two intended outcomes. A similar exercise can be done when it comes to the factors that lead to a resilient community.

Recommendation 11: Ensure joint analysis for Phase Two design.

As some of the DEC members responding to Cyclone Idai or their partners have on-going long-term programmes, they should aim for the design of Phase Two to be the result of a joint analysis.

Both development and humanitarian teams should aim for a set of commonly agreed results reducing needs while increasing resilience and reducing future risks. The Phase Two logical frameworks or theories of change should be as much as possible aligned with those of the on-going long-term programmes. Vice versa, longer-term programmes should as much as possible align their objectives with those of humanitarian disaster preparedness.

This, however, does not mean that basic assistance should be overlooked. Some communities are still living in hard to reach areas and have not had access yet to basic support. DEC members should aim to reduce needs, be they emergency needs or early recovery, while reducing risks.

Recommendation 12: DEC members should identify important environmental considerations for their projects.

Across Phase One in all three countries, only one DEC member was undertaking a “green” review to both understand the impact of their activities on the environment and learn how to mitigate this impact, and to design interventions which will build resilience of communities to future natural disasters. The Red Cross should share the report and the methodology

⁵⁵ <https://www.crs.org/our-work-overseas/research-publications/markit>

⁵⁶ Levine S. (2014) Assessing resilience: why quantification misses the point, ODI

used so that other members can benefit from the results but also further build their capacity to replicate the exercise.

XI. Annexes

XI.1. Humanitarian Coalition

Country	Region	Agency	Local partner	Source	CA\$ total	Sector
Mozambique	Dombe, Sussundenga, Manica	CLWR	LWF	Appeal funds	88,958	shelter and household items
	Beira City, Sofala	HI	HI Int.	Appeal funds	69,814	shelter and household items; livelihood, other
	Zambezia	Oxfam	AJOAGO	CHAF	700,000	shelter, WASH
Malawi	Mulanje	CFGB (PWS&D)	CARD	Appeal funds	395,615	food security
	Chikwawa and Blantyre	IRC	IR Malawi	Appeal funds	521,718	physical security, education, food security, child protection
	Phalombe	Oxfam	Oxfam Malawi	Appeal funds	400,010	WASH, protection
	Nsanje	CARE	CARE Int.	CHAF	350,000	shelter, WASH
	Machinga	Plan	Plan Int.	CHAF	350,000	shelter, WASH
Zimbabwe	Chipinge	ACF	Nutrition Action Zimbabwe	Appeal funds	118157	livelihood, food security

	Rusitu valley, Chimanimani, Manicaland	CARE	CARE Int.	Appeal funds	270,251	WASH, Livelihood
	Chimanimani, Chipinge	Plan	Plan Zimbabwe	Appeal funds	521,718	WASH, child protection
	Chimanimani, Chipinge	Save the Children	Save Int.	Appeal funds	222,349	WASH
	Chimanimani, Chipinge	Save the Children	Save Int.	CHAF	351,500	WASH, protection

Appeal funds (HC and govt. match)	2,608,590	Appeal funds (HC and govt. match)
CHAF funds	1,751,500	CHAF funds
Total funds	4,360,090	Total funds

XI.2. Review framework

Given findings from the online survey, expectations expressed in the inception workshop in London and common practice for real-time evaluations (RTE), as per ALNAP's Guide on 'Real-time evaluations of humanitarian action', Key Aid will use the following review matrix. The matrix shows the broad areas of inquiry and sub questions. Given the qualitative nature of the review, instead of having hard indicators and measurements, Key Aid will use data analysis points. The data analysis points reflect the type of data and analytical points that Key Aid will focus on in grouping response parameters and to reach conclusions.

Table 3: Review Framework

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
<p>1. To what extent is the response relevant and appropriate to the needs and priorities of the target population?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Was the response design consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives? - To what extent are the members' phase 1 plans in line with the needs and priorities of those affected (including the needs of some specific target groups such as women, people with disabilities or the very poor)? -What assessments were carried out prior to provision of services? -Where any needs expressed in the assessments not met and why? - Have protection concerns been adequately considered in the design of assistance? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nature, content and scope of assessments to conduct - Information on emerging needs and priorities of affected communities - Existing gaps in services/needs of affected communities - Targeting of particular population groups or needs - Process for prioritizing and coming up with needs for affected communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of the projects' ToC (if available); - Review of the methods used to assess beneficiaries' needs; - Interviews with DEC members and implementing partners, and FGDs with project beneficiaries confirm that the intervention is in line with their needs and priorities, including specific target groups; - Interviews with DEC members and implementing partners, and FGDs with project beneficiaries show how their needs are changing and give insights on how Phase II could adapt to those changes; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners show that protection issues were considered at design stage and how they are being addressed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparison of needs as expressed by beneficiaries in FGDs and assessment reports with support provided by the DEC members - Comparison of needs of particular groups with provisions put up by DEC member agencies. - Analysis of the changing needs of beneficiaries/target communities as time progresses - Analysis of seasonal timelines and livelihood profiles of target/affected areas with support provided and planned by DEC agencies

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
2. How effective and efficient is the project in achieving its intended outcomes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent are the activities of DEC members achieving and/or are likely to achieve their intended outcomes? - Are the activities being delivered in a timely and qualitative manner? - What are likely to be some of the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the objectives? -Did the project meet any unexpected and unforeseen issues during implementation? -What, if any, were the unintended effects? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identify challenges to achievement of results that can be addressed going into phase 2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of timelines to determine any potential gap between the response initial timeline and the current timeframe; - Interviews and FGDs with project beneficiaries shed light on some the visible outcomes with their community; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners show that the main threats to the programme were identified and that mitigation measures are in place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparisons of planned outcomes with situation obtaining on the ground - Review of response timeline and needs versus project delivery timelines - Assess trends and issues affecting project performance
3. How adaptable has the response been so far?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -What changes in approaches, targeting or other programming issues, if any, did the project make since the beginning of the response? -How are beneficiary needs now changing? And how the response adapted to those changes? -What challenges did DEC members face in trying to make any program adaptations? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Address any identified structural challenges to adapting programming - Address any identified internal challenges to adaptation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key informant interviews with project personnel with knowledge on project plans - Focus group discussions with affected communities to understand the changes in needs and the external environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of changes in the context and operating environment - Analysing how the programs responded to changes in the operating environment and affected community needs - Identify any internal or structural challenges to adapting programs

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
4. How are DEC members ensuring accountability to affected populations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent are the views of crisis-affected people (including specific target groups) considered in response design and implementation? - What mechanisms exist and are being used for prompt detection and mitigation of unintended negative effects? - How compliant is the response to the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) and other guidelines on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and what areas require further attention? -What challenges did the response come across in meeting the CHS or safeguarding crisis affected households? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Address any identified accountability deficiencies going forward - Suggest measures for Advocacy on external context specific issues that affect accountability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of secondary data and KII with DEC members and implementing partners provide evidence that the views of target population were taken into consideration; - Review of the complaint and accountability mechanisms in place; - Interviews and FGDs with project beneficiaries confirm that they are aware of those mechanisms and are able to use them if necessary; - Review of secondary data and KII with DEC members and implementing partners explain how the response is in line with the CHS and PSEA; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparison of mechanisms put in place by DEC members with the humanitarian standards and PSEA guidelines - Analysis of the knowledge by target communities of the existence of these mechanisms - Analysis of the use of complaints, feedback and other accountability mechanisms by target communities - Assessments of the structural and context issues that posed challenges to DEC members in implementing accountability and protection agencies
5. How sustainable and connected to longer-term issues has the phase I of the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -What existing longer-term programming by DEC and non-DEC members was happening in the areas? - To what extent are phase 1 programme plans taking into account the medium or 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inform changes/modifications to current programming to be more in line with longer term issues - Identify medium to longer term plans/priorities that can go into phase two programming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of National Policies and KII with development and governmental actors in the country highlight the various longer-term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seasonal context analysis for a normal year versus the cyclone year to assess how the cyclone affected normal livelihoods and other household operations

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
intervention been?	<p>longer-term priorities and needs of those affected?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent have members considered how any positive effects might be maintained in the future, after the DEC response? - What environmental impact and other longer-term impacts is the present response likely to have? -Which environmental impact of programmes was considered at design stage, and how? -Are there any possible negative impacts of the support provided by the agencies? 		<p>development issues faced by the country;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of secondary data and KII show that local capacities are being built; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners, development and governmental actors in the country show how the response fit within the longer-term dimensions; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners, development and governmental actors in the country demonstrate how the response took environmental considerations into account. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Asses the longer-term development needs expressed by communities - Asses how current programming is in line with these priorities and needs - Assess how cyclone response is building on existing development efforts - Assess whether target communities will be able to continue enjoying the benefits of the support they are currently getting after project end - Investigate any sequencing and layering of activities/interventions
6. How are DEC members maximising coordination partnerships and complementarity with other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent is the response coordinated and complemented with the efforts of other stakeholders (including implementing partners, local actors, civil society, local authorities and government, humanitarian and development actors and new actors e.g. private sector, civil society)? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Address any identified coordination problems/issues - Promote any coordination good practice - Advocate for any new or changed coordination mechanisms (broadly and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of the processes and policies in place to select implementing partners; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners show light on 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inventory of current coordination platforms and mechanisms - Assessment of challenges and success stories of coordination - Analysis of any evidence of coordination in targeting

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
organisations to achieve the intended response outcomes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Are there specific coordination efforts between DEC members for assessment, geographical targeting and response design? - What internal coordination problems have DEC members faced and how have they been addressed? 	within DEC members programming)	some of the coordination issues faced, if any; - KII with relevant in-country stakeholders confirm that the response is delivered in coordination with other initiatives.	geographical areas and thematic areas of response - Assess if and how programs across organisations are completing each other

XI.3. Detailed methodology


XI.3.1. Desk review and inception phase

The review started with a remote preliminary briefing between Key Aid and the DEC Secretariat on 3 June 2019. Beyond fostering a broad and general understanding of the DEC appeal-related projects and the consultancy's terms of reference (ToR), this briefing served to situate the consultancy in context, and discuss study matrix and indicators. The briefing also served to organise logistics for the field visits and gather the list of documents available for the desk review.

Key Aid conducted a desk review of DEC members' plans, reports and budgets for Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique.

To start the data collection process, Key Aid conducted an online survey to gather data on DEC members' and partners' field staff priority areas of inquiry. Key Aid also conducted an inception workshop in London on 18 June 2019. The workshop served a dual purpose of briefing DEC members on the response review proposed methodology and logistics, as well as on a data collection platform. Key Aid used the inception workshop to gather initial data on DEC members' expectations of the response review, cyclone response timeline and priorities for inquiry. The workshop was joined by representatives of the 13 DEC members active in the Cyclone Idai response and of the DEC Secretariat.

Figure 9 Review Timeline



XI.3.2. Primary data collection

Key Aid used Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions as the main data collection methods. Key Aid also utilised the London and Zimbabwe inception workshops to gather data from participants. To augment all these tools, Key Aid used the response timeline analysis, livelihoods profiles, and seasonal timelines for affected areas as secondary data points for validation. These tools supported the data analysis framework. Key Aid conducted a second online survey to reach key informants who couldn't be reached for face-to-face interviews.

The fieldwork portion of the RTR kicked off with an in-country briefing workshop in each country of data collection:

- Beira City (Mozambique) on 2 July 2019, and KIIs and FGDs were held between 3 July and 11 July, with the final workshop held on 12 July 2019.
- Lilongwe (Malawi) on July 4 July 2019, and KIIs and FGDs were held between 5 July and 18 July, with the final workshop held on 19 July 2019.
- Mutare (Zimbabwe) on 5 July 2019, and KIIs and FGDs were held between 8 July and 20 July with the final workshop held on 19 July 2019.

Below, a list of all key informant interviews broken down per country and type of key informant. In total, the consultants conducted KIIs with 84 people, from a wide variety of positions.

Table 4: Breakdown of Key Informants per country and type

Country	Key Informant type	Actual
Zimbabwe	DEC members	14
	Local partners	2
	Coordination bodies	2
	Local government representatives	3
	Other (nurses, AREX officials, Headmaster)	4
Total Zimbabwe		25
Mozambique	DEC members	18
	Local partners	9
	Coordination bodies	3
	Local government representatives	5
	Other (headmasters, donor representative)	3
Total Mozambique		38
Malawi	DEC members	14
	Local partners	1

	Local government representatives	4
Total Malawi		19
Global		2
TOTAL		84

The consultants also conducted Focus Group Discussions in each country under study. The breakdown of FGDs per country and district is indicated in the table below. Overall, the consultants conducted 30 FGDs, across the three countries of intervention.

Table 5: Breakdown of FGDs per location and gender

Country	Provinces	Districts	Actual	Women FGD	Men FGD	Mixed FGD
Zimbabwe	Manicaland	Chipinge	3	2	0	1
		Chimanimani	9	4	3	2
Total Zimbabwe			12	6	3	3
Mozambique	Sofala	Buzi	2	1 FGD; 11 community association members		1 FGD; 7 adolescent girls & 6 adolescent boys
		Nhamatanda	2	1 FGD; 9 OP	1 FGD; 8 OP	
		Dondo	3	1 FGD; 6 women	1 FGD; 7 men	1 FGD; 7 men & 6 women
		Beira City And Mataduro	3	2 FGD; 20 activists in Beira City & 8 women in Mataduro	1 FGD; 9 community leaders	
Total Mozambique			10	5	3	2
Malawi	Southern	Nsanje	3	-	2	1
	Southern	Chikwawa	3	1	2	-
	Southern	Phalombe	2	1	1	-
Total Malawi			8	2	5	1
TOTAL			30	13	11	6

XI.3.1. Learning workshop

At the end of the data collection phase Key Aid Consulting facilitated a half-day presentation with the key findings. The workshop served to collectively draw conclusions and

recommendations going forward. The learning workshop provided a platform for participatory learning and action planning by DEC member organisations.

XI.3.1. Analysis and Final report

Primary and secondary qualitative data was recorded and coded to analyse emerging trends. This was done using a coding matrix organised per review topic.

Additionally, Key Aid employed seasonal timeline analysis, response timelines and livelihoods profiles. These frameworks supported the analysis around the areas of inquiry as well as framing recommendations for Phase Two programming. Understanding the seasonal timeline of disaster-affected communities helped in analysing how the cyclone affected the normal livelihood strategies of communities. It aided in understanding the nature of support that communities need and will need in the future. Examining livelihood zones of affected populations deepens understanding of the effects of the cyclone on affected populations. Livelihood zones analysis helped validate information on appropriateness and relevance of interventions and in recommending appropriate interventions in Phase Two responses.

XI.4. Bibliography

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